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Murray Shanahan’s book Solving the Frame Problem describes the historical develop-
ment of the situation calculus and the event calculus approaches to reasoning about actions
and change. The book is well organized: it proceeds stepwise through different aspects of
the frame problem and presents several approaches to its solution. Along the way, Shana-
han also gives clear, concise introductions to predicate logic, to circumscription, and to
logic programming. The technicalities of these prerequisites are kept to a minimum and
are presented in the context where needed, which contributes to the ease of reading the
book’s 400 pages.
Shanahan’s book addresses the major recognized difficulties in reasoning about actions
and change: incomplete narratives, nondeterministic effects, ramification, concurrent
events, explanation of observations, and so on. It also describes many of the techniques that
have been proposed for dealing with these difficulties, such as chronological minimization,
explanation closure, occlusion (= releasing), and filtering. As Shanahan correctly points
out, these techniques are largely independent of the choice of calculus (situation calculus,
event calculus, and so forth) that is being used.
The specialist in the area will find that the book is a well written exposition of familiar
material, and it certainly fills a need in that respect. For researchers in other parts of AI,
and in other parts of applied logic, it offers a comprehensive presentation of the state of the
art in reasoning about actions. The book therefore represents an important step forward for
research in this field.
Shanahan adopts, and argues for the example-based methodology, where approaches
to formalizing actions are explained and motivated through a small number of scenario
examples, and where an existing approach can also be refuted by showing an example
where it does not provide the intended conclusions. Some of the research in this area uses
another, systematic approach, where one attempts to characterize the properties of various
known approaches: for which types of worlds does a proposed logic give correct results
(range of applicability results); what transformations on the logic are correct (for example,
transformations to a circumscriptive formulation), and so on.
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The example-based and systematic methodologies need not be mutually exclusive. It
is perfectly possible, and in fact advisable, to use them together. The advantage of the
systematic methodology is that it begins, at least, to answer the question that any user of
these logics is likely to ask: “which one of all those approaches is the best one for my
needs?” Without such an analysis, this research merely provides a menu of alternatives,
with little guidance for the user.
It is a pity that Shanahan has not taken the opportunity to include any assessment results
in his book, even informally. After all, we know that chronological minimization is correct
if all actions are nondeterministic; we also know that occlusion (or an equivalent device) is
necessary for the general case of nondeterministic actions, and so on. It would have been
easy, in a book with this structure, to show how difficulties are systematically related to
techniques.
Shanahan’s omission in this respect is even more surprising in view of the book’s
subtitle: “A Mathematical Investigation of the Common Sense Law of Inertia”. Assessment
results, of the kinds just mentioned, have a reasonable generality and require a certain
degree of mathematical investigation. The plentiful formal propositions in this book,
by contrast, are only statements about one particular toy example at a time (except for
theorems about nonmonotonic logics in general). The subtitle does seem a bit out of place,
therefore.
The author explains his methodological stance in the preface, as follows:
. . . It can be argued that an approach to the frame problem can only properly
be assessed by establishing formal correspondences with a more abstract formal
framework that encompasses a large class of examples. According to this argument,
appeals to intuitions through single examples are suspect. (. . .) I would contend that
the field is constrained by appeals to intuition until its formalisms are deployed in the
design of working systems. After all, any abstract framework that is used to assess
an approach to the frame problem is itself open to assessment. How do we know
that the abstract framework itself is correct? Only by appealing to our intuitions
in an examination of its performance on a judiciously chosen set of representative
examples. (pp. xv–xvi)
It is not clear how the deployment of a proposed design in a working system will help us
understand reliably how the same design will work in another working system, for another
application, which is what we will need to know for engineering purposes. With respect
to the choice of framework, there is one single “abstract framework” that has been used
extensively for this purpose, namely state transition systems and various generalizations of
them (for example, systems that map state × action to a set of trajectories). In particular,
state transitions systems were introduced in the early nineties for defining the underlying
semantics in both the Features and Fluents approach (Sandewall) and in action languages
such as A (Gelfond and Lifschitz). They are also a widely used framework in other
branches of engineering and in computer science, and they are much more transparent
than the modern, relatively complex logics for the frame problem.
Therefore, it is not a circular exercise to assess logics for actions and change relative to
a transition-system framework. On the contrary, doing so provides a better understanding
of when the logic works correctly and when it doesn’t, and it helps relate research in
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this area to neighboring disciplines. Shanahan’s strict adherence to only one of the two
methodologies is therefore unfortunate.
The book centers on the situation calculus and the event calculus, as the author also
points out in the preface. This may partly explain the author’s methodological stance,
since exactly these two traditions have not (to my knowledge) defined their semantics in
terms of transition systems or some other abstract world model. The development of these
two traditions is described historically, even including “dead end” approaches that are no
longer in use. This makes for easy reading, but in the event calculus part it is unfortunately
misleading.
The history of the event calculus is described as follows. The ‘original’ event calculus
was introduced by Kowalski and Sergot in 1986. Because of its various weaknesses, it was
succeeded by the ‘simplified’ event calculus (Eshgi 1988, Shanahan 1989, Kowalski 1992,
using the same references as in the book). Much of the notation was changed in the new
calculus, and the logic programming basis was replaced by a standard nonmonotonic first-
order logic using circumscription or preferential entailment.
What Shanahan misses, or fails to acknowledge, is that many of the designs of the
‘simplified’ event calculus had already been proposed or were developed concurrently
under other names. The use of linear, metric time had been advocated by Shoham
since 1986. The combination of the Initiates and Terminates predicates in the simplified
event calculus is equivalent not only to the Causes predicate in the situation calculus, as
Shanahan observes, but also to occlusion.
Any author has to restrict his topic in order to finish his work in finite time, and Shanahan
is not to be blamed for imposing restrictions on his. It is unfortunate, however, that he has
chosen restrictions that are based on label and not on content, for by doing so he misses
and leaves out an important part of the total picture in this field of research.
These critical comments illustrate that, not surprisingly, the field of actions and change
is characterized by a multiplicity of approaches and less than total agreement about
methodology; the present reviewer does differ from the book’s author on several accounts.
However, it must be said again, as in the opening paragraphs, that Shanahan’s book is
an excellent piece of work, and it is cordially recommended as a textbook for advanced
graduate courses as well as for any researcher interested in logics of actions and change.
